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Chapter 3 ‘Who’s for bioethics?’ Ian Kennedy, oversight and accountability in
the 1980s
Bioethics ceased to be an ‘American trend’ during the 1980s, when growing numbers of British outsiders publicly
demanded greater external involvement in the development of guidelines for medicine and biological science. Their
arguments were certainly successful. By the beginning of the 1990s, when the Guardian described the growing ‘ethics
industry’, supporters of this new approach were influential public figures. One of the earliest and most high profile of
these supporters was the academic lawyer Ian Kennedy. Since the late 1960s, Kennedy has written on medical
definitions of death and mental illness, euthanasia, the doctor–patient relationship and the rights of AIDS patients. In
line with the ‘hands-off’ approach of lawyers, Kennedy’s early work stressed that decisions should rest solely with the
medical profession; but this stance changed after he encountered bioethics during a spell in the United States. In 1980
Kennedy used the prestigious BBC Reith Lectures to endorse the approach that he explicitly labelled ‘bioethics’,
critiquing self-regulation and calling for external involvement in the development of professional standards.
Kennedy’s Reith Lectures, entitled Unmasking Medicine, are recognised as a pivotal moment in the history of British
bioethics, with a senior doctor identifying them as ‘one of the key events in the retreat from paternalism’.
In addition to Unmasking Medicine, Kennedy endorsed bioethics in academic publications, newspaper columns and
several other radio and television programmes during the 1980s. In this period, he also established a Centre of
Medical Law and Ethics at King’s College, London, and served on several professional and regulatory bodies. During
the 1990s he was a founding member of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics and chaired a public inquiry into human–
animal ‘xenotransplants’. His contribution to British bioethics has led one lawyer to claim that he ‘virtually invented
the field in the United Kingdom’.  In 2002 the Labour government endorsed this view when it awarded him a
knighthood for ‘services to bioethics’.
On the one hand, there was little particularly new in Kennedy’s call for outside involvement. This was pointed out in
1981 by Dame Elizabeth Ackroyd, chair of the Patients Association, who claimed that ‘the proposals which Mr
Kennedy puts forward are certainly ones which I support, and which indeed the Patients Association have advocated
for a long time’.  ‘I do not think’, Ackroyd continued, ‘that Mr Kennedy would claim that he was putting forward
new ideas.’ Kennedy’s proposals did indeed echo those made by the Patients Association and Maurice Pappworth
during the 1960s. They also drew on the civil rights campaigns Kennedy encountered in the United States, on Ivan
Illich’s critique of professions and, perhaps most significantly, on the work of American bioethicists such as Paul
Ramsey and Jay Katz.
But while there was little new in Kennedy’s calls for external involvement, they were certainly more influential than
earlier British proposals. This owed a great deal to the changing political climate in the 1980s. Kennedy’s arguments
dovetailed with a central belief of the Conservative government that was elected in 1979, which believed that
professions should be exposed to outside scrutiny in order to render them accountable to their end-users. It is no
coincidence that bioethics emerged as a recognised approach in Britain once the Conservatives promoted external
oversight as a way of ensuring public accountability and consumer choice.
This analysis provides a framework for understanding the broad context in which British bioethics emerged and
operated, connecting with major themes in contemporary history, such as declining trust in professions among neo-
liberal politicians and the rise of measures designed to enforce public accountability, which Michael Power has
characterised as the ‘audit society’. Power details how the 1980s saw the growth of mechanisms designed to monitor
professional actions, whose main ingredient was reliance on experts independent from the profession in question. The
early history of British bioethics offers substantive evidence in support of Power’s thesis. It also deepens our
understanding of how the ‘audit society’ was shaped by the interaction between political ideologies and professional
agendas. The new regimes of external oversight that emerged in the 1980s, such as bioethics, were not simply the top-
down product of Conservative demands for public accountability, but also depended on the presence of individuals
and professional groups willing to define themselves as the new arbiters of best practice.  We can thus see Kennedy’s
criticism of self-regulation and calls for outside scrutiny as a fundamental constituent of the audit society, which
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Examining Kennedy’s work also dispels presumptions that are often made about the nature and function of bioethics.
Several historians, sociologists and anthropologists have criticised bioethics for failing to ask fundamental questions
about the political economy of medicine, or of medical power and authority.  But Kennedy regularly drew attention to
the ideological aspects of medical decisions, criticised the focus on high-tech practices and claimed that professional
authority infantilised patients. His calls for outside input were attempts to redress this perceived imbalance of power,
involving others in ‘the countless decisions taken by doctors which are not medical, but involve questions of morality
or philosophy or economics or politics’.
Yet while Kennedy asked critical questions about professional authority, his work was not, as some claim, simply an
‘iconoclastic attack on medical paternalism’.  Kennedy also echoed American bioethicists when he claimed that
outside involvement would benefit doctors, by relieving them of difficult decisions and helping them overcome public
and political mistrust. This is crucial to helping us understand why bioethics became an important approach in the
1980s. Rather than simply challenging the authority of the medical profession, then, Kennedy presented it with a new
means of legitimacy in a changed political climate. This ensured that many senior figures endorsed his proposals and
Kennedy was soon ‘embraced by much of established medicine’.  We can thus appreciate the growth of bioethics in
the 1980s by seeing figures such as Kennedy as crucial intermediaries between politicians and doctors, who promised
to fulfil the neo-liberal demand for oversight while also safeguarding medicine.
From paternalism to patient empowerment
Ian McColl Kennedy was born in the West Midlands on 14 September 1941, into what he described as a ‘poor
working-class’ family.  His parents, a teacher and an electrician, encouraged their three sons to make the most of the
opportunities provided by the postwar welfare state. In 2003 Kennedy recalled that: ‘My father in particular was
anxious to inculcate in us the notion that we were getting what opportunities we were enjoying by virtue of the taxes
and the welfare state, on the back of those who had gone to war … It was our duty to give something back, if we
made it.’
Kennedy also grew up in a postwar era in which professions were well regarded.  This was especially true of
medicine, following the creation of the NHS, the development of antibiotics and the production of ‘magic bullets’
against diseases such as polio. This high esteem was reflected by the fact that two of Ian Kennedy’s brothers studied
medicine at university, while he went on to read law at University College London (UCL) before attaining a Master of
Laws degree from the University of California, Berkeley. During his time in the United States, Kennedy recalls, the
growing civil rights movement strengthened his existing ‘sense of social justice, of entitlement of anybody, no matter
where they’re from, to have an even break, to have a chance’.
Kennedy returned to Britain in 1965, when he was appointed lecturer in law at UCL. While teaching jurisprudence, he
became interested in the longstanding issue of when someone began and ceased to be legally defined as a person.
Much of this interest stemmed from contemporary debates prompted by new medical technologies. Prominent lawyers
such as Glanville Williams had previously investigated how medical techniques such as resuscitation impacted on
legal definitions of life and death; but questions surrounding exactly when a person died had increased during the
1960s, thanks to the development of artificial respirators for brain-damaged and seriously ill individuals, and the
realisation these so-called ‘twilight patients’ were a source of organs for newly developed transplant techniques.
Since death was legally defined as ‘absence of vital functions’ such as circulation and breathing, and since a
fundamental requirement in the crime of murder was that the killing must have been of a ‘life in being’, various
groups questioned whether a patient dependent on a ventilator was alive or dead and, consequently, whether a doctor
who turned a machine off could be charged with murder.
These questions were highlighted by a 1963 coroner’s inquest, Re Potter, which investigated the death of a man who
had been seriously assaulted, stopped breathing and was then placed on an artificial respirator. Having decided that he
would not recover, doctors removed a kidney for transplantation, pronounced him dead and turned the machine off. A
neurosurgeon later admitted that the patient had no hope of recovery and was only placed on the respirator because
another patient needed a kidney transplant. The case raised the question of when death occurred and whether it had
been caused by the original assailant, the doctor who removed the kidney, or the doctor who turned the machine off.
The doctors involved told the inquest that they believed the patient died when he originally stopped breathing and the
coroner agreed, clearing them of any wrongdoing and charging the assailant with manslaughter. But according to
existing legal criteria, the patient had not died until the machine had been turned off and ‘vital functions’ had
permanently ceased. Although the coroner’s inquest diverged from this view, he ventured no firm opinion on when
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surgeons who removed hearts from ventilated patients in Japan and the United States were charged with murder, and
British newspapers portrayed transplant doctors as ‘vultures’ hovering over ill and vulnerable patients.
Kennedy engaged with this issue in 1969, writing an article that outlined ‘the legal problems surrounding the moment
of death’ as they related to transplant surgery.  He used a discussion of Re Potter to claim that ‘the accepted legal
definition of death seems no longer to fit the realities of modern medicine and proves unworkable in certain
circumstances’.  As he would throughout his career, Kennedy condemned the ‘very English reluctance to do
anything about the situation until it has caused difficulty’ and called for guidelines to forestall legal cases.  He
warned that if the present uncertainty continued, ‘techniques and practices which have come to be regarded as
established must stop or forever be open to challenge as regards their legality’.
But Kennedy notably endorsed the ‘hands-off’ approach that lawyers adopted when it came to medicine, claiming that
‘the re-definition of death should be left wholly to the medical profession’.  Far from leading or guiding doctors, he
argued, the law should only change ‘once there is an established consensus in the medical world’.  Kennedy believed
this would give legal recognition ‘to what is now accepted as a matter of practice … that the turning off of a machine
seems not a positive act of killing’.  ‘In other words’, he suggested, ‘since it is suggested that the law turns a blind
eye to what doctors now do, the insecurity which dogs the doctor should be dispelled by the gradual acceptance of
agreed medical practice as lawful.’  ‘The law would be then,’ he continued, ‘that if the doctor could prove that what
he has done was in good faith and was skilful there would be no further inquiry into the relative worth or propriety of
his actions.’  Kennedy argued that this would help ensure ‘security for the doctor’, by fostering ‘a realisation that the
medical profession is a responsible body requiring a high standard of conduct of its members’.
Kennedy reiterated this position in a 1972 article for the Medico-Legal Journal, written while he was adjunct
professor of law at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). Again claiming that the ‘old legal definition of
death needs modification in light of advances in medical science’, he outlined growing support for the view that death
occurred when destruction of the brain stem caused irreversible coma and dependence on a ventilator, as an ad hoc
committee from Harvard had proposed in a 1968 report.  Kennedy claimed that in order to avoid ‘the impression of
haste by overzealous surgeons’ if the concept were adopted, two sets of doctors should employ a battery of standard
tests to determine ‘brain death’ and the consent of relatives should always be sought for organ transplants.  He also
argued that doctors should not support patients on ventilators once brain death had been confirmed and ‘there was no
hope of survival’.  As before, Kennedy concluded by stating that whatever criteria were adopted, the ‘doctor’s
judgment must prevail’ and the courts must ‘follow the consensus of medical opinion’.
These two articles illustrate how British lawyers continued to defer to the medical profession in the 1960s and 1970s.
Like Kennedy, others endorsed the Bolam ruling and claimed that doctors should be left to determine their own
standards of care. In his closing remarks to a 1966 CIBA symposium on ethics and organ transplantation, the judge
Lord Charles Kilbrandon stated that a lawyer would never answer the question of ‘what is death … because that is a
technical, professional medical matter. It is entrusted to medical men to say when a man is dead, and nobody but a
doctor can decide that.’  At the same symposium, David Daube, professor of civil law at Oxford, similarly claimed
that defining death was ‘of a scientific character and prima facie not for us’.  Daube also echoed the Hatcher ruling
when he warned that legal interference would ‘frighten doctors into passivity’ – preventing them from thinking about
medical progress and the good of their patients.  He argued that when they considered specific practices, lawyers
should always ‘be generous and leave the verdict to the rectitude and good sense of the doctor’.
But Kennedy began to criticise this position after his return from the United States and appointment to King’s
College, London, in the late 1970s. In several publications, lectures and radio talks he now argued that patients should
have greater say in their treatment and, crucially, that outsiders should play a role in setting standards for the medical
profession. This was first evident in a 1976 article for the Criminal Law Review, in which he claimed that patients had
a fundamental right to self-determination that overrode the paternalistic view that ‘decisions concerning a person’s
fate are better made for him than by him’.  This, he argued, included terminally ill or elderly patients who wished to
discontinue treatment that was keeping them alive. Kennedy stated that once a patient declared a wish to have
treatment discontinued, the doctor was ‘obliged to respect it’.  This principle, he continued, should be ‘guaranteed
and safe-guarded’ by consent law so that ‘if a patient withholds consent, if he refuses to be touched by a doctor, any
further touching will be unlawful and give rise to civil and criminal liability’.
The same year, Kennedy published an article that departed from the usual line in the Journal of Medical Ethics,
calling for outside involvement in the development of medical guidelines. This proposal arose in a discussion of
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then attached to a ventilator ‘without any prospect of regaining consciousness’.  Kennedy detailed how doctors and a
county judge had refused a parental request for the ventilator to be turned off, as Quinlan showed evidence of residual
brain activity and was therefore alive according to the ‘brain-death’ criteria.  He argued that the ongoing controversy
and uncertainty surrounding the Quinlan case ‘serves as a timely reminder of the need for a code of practice’.
Should a similar case arise in Britain, he continued, ‘the unfortunate position exists whereby the doctor must make a
decision which obviously could have grave legal ramifications without any legal guidance’. In contrast to his earlier
work, which stated that decisions regarding ventilated patients should ‘be left wholly to the medical profession’,
Kennedy chastised lawyers for ‘saying that these are medical matters’ and shifting ‘the responsibility for decision
[sic] back to the hapless doctor’.  He now believed that they were ‘patently not merely medical matters’ and asserted
that ‘doctors function within a framework of legal and social rules which go beyond the rules of their particular
profession and must be observed’.  This led Kennedy to conclude that any code of practice should be ‘worked out by
the medical profession after consultation with lawyers, theologians and other interested parties’.
After meeting a BBC radio producer, Kennedy had the chance to make these arguments in public. Between 1976 and
1978 he presented several radio programmes on the care of disabled babies, euthanasia and reform of the Mental
Health Act.  In his 1977 documentary The Check-Out, Kennedy asserted that euthanasia was ‘a matter on which not
just doctors or lawyers, but all of us, must have our say and our way’. The only way to ensure this, he concluded, was
to give ‘all interested parties’ a role in the development of regulatory codes.  Although the subject matter of
Kennedy’s documentaries varied, his underlying message remained the same. A British Medical Journal review of the
1978 programme The Defect, which debated screening for spina bifida during pregnancy, noted that Kennedy’s core
argument was that doctors’ opinions ‘should be challenged by other members of society’.
What influenced Kennedy’s retreat from paternalism? His work from 1976 onwards certainly incorporated elements
from Ivan Illich’s and Thomas Szasz’s radical critiques of medical authority. In a 1979 lecture at the Middlesex
Hospital medical school, which highlighted the moral, political and economic aspects of medical decisions, and
reiterated that they were ‘not for doctors alone to make’, Kennedy acknowledged his debt to Illich’s claim that ‘the
whole of medicine is a moral enterprise, since it defines what is normal and, in behavioural terms, what is proper’.
Later in the lecture, he endorsed Illich’s ‘description of the doctor’s attitude to his patient as one of infantilization’.
Kennedy also shared Illich’s scepticism towards the current state of medical ethics, believing that groups such as the
SSME and the LMG were ‘inward looking’ and did little to challenge professional authority.  This was evident in his
1976 Criminal Law Review paper, where he quoted Szasz’s 1961 claim that ‘much of what passes for medical ethics is
a set of rules the net effect of which is the persistent infantilization and subjugation of the patient’.
But while he endorsed their critiques of paternalism, Kennedy distanced himself from the more radical aspects of
Szasz’s and Illich’s work. He was clear that he did ‘not necessarily endorse’ Illich’s sweeping denunciation of the
professions and belief that ‘nemesis for the masses is now the inescapable backlash of industrial progress’.  And in a
radio talk on the Mental Health Act, Kennedy ridiculed as ‘preposterous’ Szasz’s claim that ‘there is no such thing as
mental illness’.  ‘Most people’, he countered, ‘regard mental illness as a reality, not a myth’, and there was little to
be gained from believing that ‘psychiatrists act as agents of a malevolent government intent on locking away or
otherwise suppressing those who deviate from an accepted norm’.
Kennedy also acknowledged his debt to more moderate critics in this period, including the doctors Thomas McKeown
and Muir Gray. McKeown and Gray both argued that the major causes of illness were poverty, poor public health and
nutritional problems, and called for a less interventionist, technocratic approach to medicine.  In his 1979 lecture at
the Middlesex Hospital, Kennedy drew on their work to claim that:
there seems little doubt that the single largest cause of illness, however defined, is poverty and what it brings in
its wake … Yet we continue to ride the same tired whirligig of disease identification, exchanging one problem
for a new one. And we do so, notwithstanding the fact that, by comparison with the effects produced by
sanitation and clean water, medicine’s advances are really rather limited.
In this and other talks, Kennedy used McKeown and Gray to endorse a broad ‘reorientation’ of medicine, arguing that
doctors should focus more on ‘promotion of health’ rather than simply the treatment of disease.  This reflected his
own enthusiasm for social fairness and ‘the politics of welfarism’.  And it ultimately bolstered his calls for outside
involvement in setting standards and priorities: for ‘if we are to change the way medicine is thought of and practised,
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Yet the greatest influence on Kennedy’s changing worldview appeared to be the ‘brilliant insights’ of the bioethicists
he encountered while teaching in America during the early 1970s.  In his 1976 paper on self-determination, for
instance, he cited Paul Ramsey’s ‘outrage’ at the fact that it was ‘possible to deprive many a patient of a fulfilment of
the wish to have a death of one’s own’.  At the beginning of The Patient as Person, Ramsey stated that a patient’s
interests would be better served by involving outsiders in medical ethics, and this became a constant theme in
Kennedy’s work from 1976. Kennedy also claimed to find ‘much of value’ in the work of Jay Katz and his young
research associate Alexander Capron, who both also endorsed outside involvement with medical decision-making.
Kennedy was struck by this ‘seminal work on bioethics’ at a time when he believed ‘we were doing nothing in this
country’.  On returning from the United States, he argued that Britain had ‘no vehicle’ for the public discussion of
issues such as euthanasia, patient rights and medical decision-making. He dismissed the medical groups and the
Journal of Medical Ethics as ‘too narrow’ and ‘preaching only to the converted, namely the people who came to the
lectures were the people you didn’t need to have at the lectures, and the people who didn’t come were the people you
needed to reach’.  This frustration was apparent in Kennedy’s regular calls for external involvement from 1976
onwards. As he stated in The Check-Out: ‘It’s a deplorable fact that for far too long lawyers and others have ignored
this important area [medical ethics] and left doctors alone to wrestle with its complexities’.
Seeing bioethics as the major influence on Kennedy’s work also helps us determine why his calls for external
involvement eventually became so influential. Like American figures such as Jay Katz, who promised not to ‘indict
science or stifle research’, Kennedy stressed that involving outsiders would benefit medicine.  He spent most of his
Criminal Law Review article, for example, assuring doctors that they would not be prosecuted for meeting a
terminally ill patient’s request to have their treatment discontinued. Indeed he argued, on the contrary, that meeting the
growing demand for self-determination was less likely to prompt a legal challenge than the traditional approach of
‘doctor knows best’.  And in his lecture at the Middlesex Hospital, he stressed that ‘it is important at this point to
make clear that I am not criticizing doctors or attacking them or purporting to sit in judgement over them’.  Instead,
he sympathised that:
I think it is unfair that responsibility in many areas of human concern has been improperly shifted onto doctors
by the rest of us, simply because we are happy to have others bear this responsibility, and because the doctor, at
least initially, seems prepared to take it on.
Kennedy promised that a more active role for outsiders would help doctors resolve the ‘many hard decisions which it
is not really their job to make’.
But this conciliatory approach initially made little headway. While doctors may have encouraged interdisciplinary
debates during the 1970s, they were less enthusiastic about devolving power to outsiders. In 1977 the BMA argued
that outside involvement in medical decisions would damage doctor–patient relations, ‘endanger research, increase
waiting-lists and threaten the health and morale of doctors’.  Their resistance was not lost on Kennedy, who admitted
that ‘the moment I offer guidance or suggest what should be done, I am met with a chorus of cries, all variations on
the theme that I do not really understand, that these are medical matters after all, that I should not trespass on the
professional competence of others’.
But this attitude softened in the 1980s, when political changes fostered the ‘audit society’.  Kennedy’s arguments
now carried greater weight amid a political emphasis on oversight and public accountability, and senior doctors
conceded that traditional forms of self-regulation might be untenable. He consequently became central to a growing
form of public debate and regulation, which newspapers and the medical press joined him in labelling ‘bioethics’.
‘Who’s for bioethics?’ The Reith Lectures, the Conservatives and the 1980s
Following Kennedy’s radio lectures, which gained him a reputation as a skilled broadcaster, the BBC’s director-
general invited him to give the prestigious Reith Lectures on Radio Four.  The Reith Lectures were established in
1948 to honour Sir John Reith, the BBC’s first director-general. They are delivered annually by public intellectuals,
and speakers before Kennedy had included Bertrand Russell, the biologist John Z. Young and the anthropologist
Edmund Leach.  When Kennedy was approached in spring 1979, the lecture themes were the only piece of
programme content that the BBC board of directors had the power to select. After requesting several options from
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The BBC officially announced Kennedy was its thirty-second Reith Lecturer in December 1979. The major focus of
newspaper profiles in the build-up to his lectures was that he was talking on a subject which, the Observer stated, ‘the
great panjandrums of the medical profession like to reserve for themselves’.  Journalists also detailed how a major
premise of the lectures was that ‘the community should take back some of the control which it has ceded to the
medics’, with ‘lawyers looking over doctor’s shoulders … and a vigilant public endorsing their large decisions’.  The
Guardian notably described this outside perspective as ‘bio-ethics’, which was a term that British newspapers had
traditionally joined the British Medical Journal in attributing to ‘Americans, with their unfortunate gift for inventing
new specialisms’.
Kennedy’s Reith Lectures, entitled Unmasking Medicine, consisted of six thirty-minute talks that were broadcast
during November and December 1980. Each lecture discussed aspects of his work since 1976. Kennedy began the
first lecture by stating that when it came to issues such as the definition of death, the treatment of the mentally ill and
care of disabled babies, ‘medicine is in the hands of experts and sets its own path’.  He claimed that doctors had
attained this power by portraying definitions of health and illness as ‘terms of scientific exactitude’.  Kennedy then
drew on Illich and Foucault to contend that ‘the normal state against which to measure abnormality is a product of
social and cultural values and expectations. It is not some static, objectively identifiable fact.’  He continued that in
medicine generally, and psychiatry especially, there was in fact a ‘relationship between calling someone ill and
making a moral judgement about him’.  ‘If illness is a judgement’, he argued, ‘the practice of medicine can be
understood in terms of power. He who makes the judgements wields the power.’
Drawing on McKeown and Gray, Kennedy then discussed broader determinants of health and disease and claimed
that ‘Very many of the people to whom we are readily prepared to ascribe the status “ill” find themselves ill because
they are poor, grow up in bad housing, eat poor food, work, if at all, in depressing jobs, and generally exist on the
margin of survival.’  This led Kennedy to the broad conclusion that permeated all his Reith Lectures:
As long as it is accepted that health is the exclusive preserve of doctors, something only they have competence
in, then this state of affairs will continue. It is a matter of balance; the power is now with the professional. Only
when it is realised that health is far too important to be left entirely to doctors, that it is a matter for all of us, will
conditions be created for the necessary redirection of effort and resources. Only then will any real movement
towards health be achieved.
In the second lecture, Kennedy revived his critiques of interventionist approaches to argue that medicine was ‘pursued
in ways that do not best serve the needs of society’.  He claimed that this led to disproportionate investment in fields
such as transplant surgery, which treated relatively few patients, while fields such as geriatric medicine and mental
health were largely ignored. Kennedy concluded that this emphasis led the public to believe ‘in magic cures and the
waving of magic wands’, while the reality was a ‘constant disappointment’ where ‘the promised or expected cures are
not there’.
In lecture three, he outlined ‘a better path for the future’ and stated that ‘we must curb our predilection for medicine in
the form of ever more complex technology’ and ‘direct more of our energy and resources towards the promotion of
good health’.  The focus here was firmly on primary care and education, on preventing deaths through ‘cigarette
smoking, alcohol consumption, appalling dietary habits, dangerous workplaces and roads’.  Kennedy concluded that
‘If GPs were more adequately prepared for the real health needs of their patients, which are as much to do with social
problems as with particular diseases, then the beginnings of a better movement towards health could emerge.’
While his first three lectures drew mainly on Illich, McKeown and Gray, Kennedy’s fourth lecture owed a large debt
to American bioethics. Here, he echoed Paul Ramsey’s claim that ‘medical ethics are not separate from but part of the
general moral and ethical order by which we live’. Drawing on Jay Katz, he also called for ‘a wholesale re-
examination of the sphere of alleged competence of the doctor’.  Kennedy claimed that in choosing whether or not to
treat severely disabled babies, doctors currently ‘decide on the basis of some rough-and-ready calculus of the future
quality of life’.  And this, he argued, led to uneven outcomes, ‘where in figurative terms, the baby in Barnsley lives,
the baby in Bradford dies’.
Kennedy then pointed out that deciding issues such as quality of life was in fact ‘profoundly difficult’, involving not
only medical but also legal, economic, philosophical and social considerations.  He claimed to find it striking that
‘despite their significance they are not widely discussed. They are resolved in the consulting room and debated, if at
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standards set down by all of us’.  This, he continued, would foster ‘regularity if not uniformity in the decisions
arrived at but also some conformity between these decisions and those which the rest of us might take’.  Although he
ventured no firm plan of how this might be achieved, Kennedy stated that a vital first step was ensuring that ‘doctors
have some educational grounding in ethical analysis’. And in a now familiar swipe at paternalism, he stressed that this
‘must be taught not be some superannuated elder statesman nor by the latest medical star in the firmament, but by an
outsider, someone who is not deafened by the rhetoric of medicine’.
After a fifth lecture in which he discussed the categorisation of mental illness and questioned the appropriate norm for
mental health, Kennedy again endorsed outside involvement in the sixth and final lecture.  He argued that viewing
patients as consumers rather than passive recipients of healthcare gave them greater ‘power to participate responsibly
in decisions made about [their] life’.  Kennedy spent much of the lecture dismissing the suggestion that the best
route to consumerism in Britain was an increase in private litigation. He argued that litigation was more justifiable in
the United States because patients paid for their own healthcare through private insurance schemes and ‘if someone
suffers harm unexpectedly, he needs money to pay for additional medical care or to meet other costs’.  In Britain, by
contrast, he claimed that there was ‘less need for this form of consumerist litigation’ thanks to ‘a social welfare
system and free health care … which can serve as the basic source of funds for patients who complain of harm’.
Kennedy believed that litigation consequently had a ‘more limited’ role in Britain, with patients only being justified in
suing doctors if they were detained without consent or treated without full disclosure of potential risks.
Kennedy nevertheless believed that this small number of cases might, if successful, ‘ensure that standards of practice
were established which met the approval of outsiders’.  But he also noted that British courts ‘tend toward
conservatism’ and would be ‘reluctant to break new ground’ by departing from the Bolam ruling and judging medical
conduct themselves.  He proposed that consumerism in Britain should therefore ‘take another tack’. This involved
the establishment of a supervisory ‘board or committee’ charged with ‘establishing standards which doctors must
meet in their practice, measuring the doctor’s performance in the light of these standards, and creating means of
redress for the patient and sanctions against the doctor if these standards are breached’.
Kennedy was keen to distance his proposed body from ‘paternalistic’ organisations such as the GMC. ‘Standards will
have to be set and measured by others’, he argued, and ‘the principle of outside scrutiny, a key feature of
consumerism, seems inevitable.’  He closed the Reith Lectures by proposing that the impetus for this ‘separate
method of supervision’ would ‘have to come from the consumer, and the consumer will have to be prominently
represented on any Board or Committee which is set up’.
Transcripts of the Reith Lectures appeared weekly in the BBC’s Listener magazine, and all six were published as a
book by Allen and Unwin in May 1981. As Kennedy wrote in a preface, the book provided ‘the opportunity to put a
bit more flesh on the bones of my arguments’ and contained an additional chapter on the definition of death. It also
included a detailed bibliography ‘to show how wide is the range of materials which someone entering into this area of
study needs to cover’.  This included books by Illich, McKeown and Szasz, by bioethicists such as Ramsey and
Katz, and by practically minded philosophers such as Mary Warnock and Peter Singer. Kennedy then defined
precisely what this ‘area of study’ entailed and firmly aligned his Reith Lectures with the approach he encountered in
the United States. ‘Fundamentally’, he stated, ‘it is the study of the practice of medicine today.’ But this, critically,
was ‘not a field in which it is necessary to be trained in medicine. Indeed, it could be said that only someone who is
free from any claims which medical professional loyalty may make on his objectivity who can successfully examine the
institution of medicine.’  Kennedy outlined how this approach involved ‘ethics and law, together with sprinklings of
philosophy, sociology and politics … as they relate to medicine’. While he admitted that there was no ‘single label for
it’ in Britain, he noted that ‘In the United States the area goes by the name of “Bioethics”’.
In the book chapter based on his sixth Reith lecture, Kennedy argued that support for outside involvement was
growing and that paternalistic attitudes were ‘clearly out of line with the political tenor of the day’. ‘Consumerism is
with us’, he stated, and ‘the doctor has the choices only of accepting it willingly and cooperating, or of accepting it
unwillingly.’  But Kennedy had to rely mainly on American examples to support this claim, including the ‘series of
ethics committees’ that included a majority of non-doctors. ‘We have much to learn’, he concluded, ‘from how this
aspect of consumerism has developed in the United States.’  When it came to Britain, Kennedy cited the presence of
lay members on GMAG as ‘a good example of the sort of arrangement I envisage’.  But GMAG was not really
comparable to the American committees that Kennedy praised. Scientists remained in the majority and were viewed
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But this situation was to change during the 1980s, thanks to the election of a government that shared Kennedy’s
enthusiasm for outside involvement and ‘empowered consumers’. Kennedy’s call for the public to ‘take back control
of medicine’ dovetailed with a central ideology of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party, which won the 1979
general election. While they lauded private enterprise, the Prime Minister and politicians on the right of the
Conservatives, such as Keith Joseph and Nicholas Ridley, regarded state-supported and self-regulating professions as
complacent, wasteful and unresponsive to the market forces they saw as vital to regenerating the economy.  Seeking
a coherent strategy for revitalising Britain, they drew on neo-liberal theorists such as Milton Friedman and William
Niskanen, who believed that welfare states had allowed professions to become overly bureaucratic and self-serving,
and argued that the solution lay in remodelling them on market lines.
The influence of this neo-liberal worldview was apparent in a 1980 speech by Nigel Lawson, who encouraged
privatisation of the public sector during his time as Treasury Secretary, Secretary of State for Energy and Chancellor
of the Exchequer. Lawson declared that the new government would ‘break from the predominantly social democratic
assumptions that have underlain policy in postwar Britain’ by exposing many professions and public services to ‘the
disciplines of the market’.  As the 1980s progressed it became clear that this involved promoting outside scrutiny
and involvement as a means of devolving power from professionals to end-users – to parents, patients, students etc. –
and enabling them to make decisions that furthered their own interests.
Reflecting the Conservative commitment to ‘rolling back the frontiers of the state’, scrutiny was not to be performed
directly by politicians but was entrusted to an array of consultants and agencies who acted on behalf of consumers,
which Alex Mold defines as ‘consumerism by proxy’.  Mold claims that when it came to medicine, ‘consumerism
by proxy’ was evident in the Conservative belief that managers and fund-holding GPs were the best guardians of
patients’ interests.  But it also, crucially, dovetailed with Kennedy’s belief that patient empowerment was best
achieved through outside scrutiny of medical practices and decisions.
Throughout the 1980s, in professions such as teaching, medicine, academia, social services and local government,
reliance on professional expertise subsequently gave way to new mechanisms of external audit that were designed to
enforce value-for-money, public accountability and consumer choice.  Change was gradual and proceeded well into
the 1990s, but Lawson’s speech demonstrates that the Conservatives voiced their intentions early on. This was not lost
on the medical profession, which linked Kennedy’s Reith Lectures to this neo-liberal worldview. Writing in the
Lancet, for example, John D. Swales, head of medicine at the University of Leicester, pointed out that ‘Kennedy’s
views enjoy the enormous advantage of following the current political tide’. Swales claimed that doctors should
‘therefore look a little more closely at what he is saying rather than succumbing to dismissive comments on his
style’.  Sir Douglas Black, the president of the Royal College of Physicians, similarly believed that ‘Kennedy’s
views have to be taken seriously, both for their own sake and because they are representative of the forces that seek to
effect a radical change in the focus of medicine’.
While the psychiatrist Stephen Little criticised Kennedy for a lack of concrete proposals, he also conceded that: ‘To
follow the rhetoric of the present government, the public must become more fully informed of the pressures on its
medical practitioners and administrators, of the shortcomings as well as the advances.’  And Michael Thomas, chair
of the BMA, endorsed Kennedy’s call for a diverse committee that acted as proxy for patients and the public, as part
of ‘a situation where all doctors are willing to accept that the public has a right to take part in the decisions on major
moral and ethical issues’. Such changes were needed, Thomas stated, because ‘the era which required paternalism is
past’.
This complicates the ‘origin myth’ that bioethics was opposed by a recalcitrant medical profession. While some
doctors dismissed Kennedy’s lectures as ‘doctor bashing’, many senior figures saw the benefits, or inevitability, of
external involvement with medicine.  These views were compounded between 1981 and 1984, when growing
numbers of politicians and public figures echoed Kennedy’s calls for external oversight and patient empowerment. In
1981 Margaret Thatcher appointed Normal Fowler as Secretary of State for Health and Social Services. Fowler
explicitly viewed patients and the public as ‘consumers’, and believed that non-doctors should play a major role in
designing policies that rendered medicine more transparent, competitive and publicly accountable.
As the next chapter shows, this was evident when senior figures at the Department of Health and Social Security
(DHSS) prioritised the appointment of an ‘outside chair’ to a public inquiry into IVF and embryo research in 1982. It
was also clear in the 1983 decision to select the businessman Sir Roy Griffiths as chair of an inquiry into NHS
management. Reflecting the government’s enthusiasm for market-oriented reform, the other inquiry members were
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consumer influence when it claimed that: ‘Businessmen have a keen sense of how well they are looking after their
customers. Whether the NHS is meeting the needs of the patient, and the community, and can prove that it is doing so,
is open to question.’  In a further blow to paternalism, Griffiths’s inquiry suggested that the NHS would be better
run by general managers recruited from outside the medical profession.
Further support for external involvement also came from public figures such as Mary Warnock, following her
selection as chair of the government’s IVF inquiry, and the Australian-born lawyer Geoffrey Robertson, who used a
1982 Observer column to claim that ‘interdisciplinary co-operation and insistence on public participation’ were vital
to solving ‘the present, not to mention the future, dilemmas of bio-ethics’.  Robertson argued it was no longer
adequate for lawyers to ‘wash their hands and leave decisions in the sterilized gloves of the medical profession’.
‘Workable and acceptable’ rules for medicine, he stated, ‘should not be developed behind a closed door marked
“Medical Ethics – laymen and lawyers keep out”.’
Many speakers at a 1984 GMC conference on ‘Teaching Medical Ethics’ also endorsed outside involvement with
medicine. The sociologist Margaret Stacey, for example, criticised ‘the “closed system” in which the medical
profession works wherein the greater part of social as well as professional time is spent with other members of the
profession’.  Stacey argued that making decisions on a patient’s behalf, without consulting other professionals or the
patient themselves, derived from an outdated ‘model of the [doctor–patient] relationship where the doctor is seen as
active and the patient passive, as opposed to one of mutual activity, a partnership in healing or managing disease’.
She proposed that doctors should rectify this by opening their records to patients and, where applicable, the public.
Stacey claimed that ‘this would be not only in the interest of the public but also of the profession’. ‘All doctors are
aware how difficult such judgements are’, she continued, ‘and to make records more open would help the public share
these problems too.’
At the same conference, John Habgood, the Archbishop of York, argued that ‘insights and values from another field of
awareness should be fed into the practical business of decision-making’.  Habgood similarly presented outside
involvement as beneficial to doctors, claiming that it would help them share the ‘crushing burden’ imposed by
‘decisions to make which bear directly on the lives of individuals with whom you are personally involved’.
Surveying this changing landscape for the Hastings Center Report in 1984, the doctor and philosopher Raanan Gillon
argued that the 1980s marked the end of ‘medicine’s halcyon days when doctors – for the most part only senior
doctors – discussed the dilemmas of medical ethics in privacy and leisure’. ‘Today’, he noted, ‘everyone in Britain
seems to be muscling in.’ Gillon claimed that these changes were ‘ably abetted by the lawyer whom doctors love-
hate, Professor Ian Kennedy’.  While Gillon conceded that he was no longer the sole advocate of oversight, he
nevertheless noted that Kennedy continued to ‘vigorously stir the pot’.
Indeed, the regularity with which Kennedy continued to publicly ‘stir the pot’ led medical journals to dub him ‘the
ubiquitous Ian Kennedy’.  In a 1981 radio documentary, he proposed the establishment of outside ‘inspectorates’
that would ‘ensure proper accountability across many professions’.  Writing for the Journal of Medical Ethics the
same year, Kennedy justified this proposal on the grounds that: ‘If a profession by definition exists to serve the public
interest, then clearly it must ultimately be the public who judge what that interest is and whether it is being served.’
Kennedy’s profile increased further in 1983, when he hosted the BBC television series Doctors’ Dilemmas, in which
actors presented a doctor with an ethical dilemma and their decision was scrutinised by a diverse studio panel. In a
favourable review for the British Medical Journal, Raanan Gillon claimed the programme’s message, like all
Kennedy’s work, was that ‘doctors and medical students need far more interdisciplinary discussion and debate about
medical ethics’.
Kennedy used his high profile to reassert that outside involvement would benefit doctors. In his final Reith Lecture,
he promised that if his proposals were implemented, ‘it wouldn’t only be the patient who would gain. The doctor too
would benefit, as would the practice of medicine.’  He expanded on these benefits in a Journal of Medical Ethics
article that rejected his portrayal as a ‘doctor-basher’. Here, Kennedy criticised the tendency to label all non-doctors
as ‘laymen’, which he believed rhetorically stripped them of any expertise. He argued that philosophers and lawyers
were trained to analyse ethical or legal issues, and that when confronted with particular ethical dilemmas ‘it may be
the doctor who is the layman’.  Kennedy claimed that external input would thus offer ‘great help to doctors if only
they would understand that it offers a guide to what they need to do where none existed before’.
In the preface to his book of the Reith Lectures, Kennedy also claimed that giving patients greater say in their
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doctors a great disservice by shuffling off onto them a range of problems which they should not be expected to deal
with.’  In an updated version of the book, published in 1983, Kennedy stressed that this would encourage ‘a
relationship of partners in the enterprise of health’.  The stress on ‘partners’ helped Kennedy frame bioethics as a
collaborative endeavour, in which lawyers, philosophers, politicians and patients were ‘not interfering, but trying to
help’.  He concluded that giving patients greater responsibility and allowing outsiders to set standards would not
impede medical practice, but would ‘produce guidelines for future conduct, tools for analysis, which will forearm the
doctor’.
In the updated edition of Unmasking Medicine and a 1984 article for the Criminal Law Review, Kennedy also
reassured doctors that he was not advocating outside involvement on a case-by-case basis in ‘a ghastly on-site
Committee’. He instead proposed that ‘it is the guidelines for conduct, and the analytical tools, which will be worked
out by the non-doctor, along with the doctor’.  As in his final Reith lecture, Kennedy recommended that these
guidelines should be designed and issued by a ‘permanent standing advisory committee’ comparable to the President’s
Commission in the United States. In addition to drawing up codes of practice, he proposed that the committee’s
interdisciplinary staff would also keep ‘developments in medicine under constant review, with a view to identifying
and responding to ethical issues’.  And Kennedy again stressed that this committee would benefit doctors by
aligning medicine with public expectations and thereby preventing ‘a sense of bitterness and frustration, out of which
grows further litigation’.
By the mid 1980s growing numbers of doctors appeared to agree. Speaking at the GMC conference on ‘Teaching
Medical Ethics’, the surgeon Ronald Welbourne argued that student doctors should be taught by individuals ‘drawn
from all relevant disciplines’, including ‘clinical practice, moral philosophy, theology, law, sociology and other
branches of learning’.  Welbourne claimed that each of these disciplines ‘is essential and none is adequate alone’.
He also shared Kennedy’s belief that outside involvement in developing guidelines would benefit ‘patients and
doctors’ by boosting public confidence and preventing excessive ‘legislation and litigation’.
We might expect Welbourne to have supported interdisciplinary approaches, as he served on the editorial board of the
Journal of Medical Ethics and chaired the Institute of Medical Ethics (IME), which was the new name for the SSME.
But support also came from other quarters. Although the Lancet was more guarded than Welbourne, identifying
external involvement as ‘an uneasy but necessary compromise’, it nevertheless acknowledged that it had become vital
to protecting the interests of ‘the individual patient, those of the doctor, and those of scientific progress’.  In a
review of Doctor’s Dilemmas, it noted that if ‘difficulties and decisions were aired more widely, decision-making
might be more even and suspicions might be allayed’.  And in another article, entitled ‘Who’s for Bioethics
Committees?’, the Lancet reiterated that bioethics would safeguard ‘not only patients but also doctors and the
institutions in which they work’. Outside involvement, it concluded, would help doctors develop guidelines, prevent
litigation and ration ‘the available and now inadequate resources of the National Health Service’.
This professional acceptance underpinned the increasing recruitment of philosophers, lawyers and other non-doctors
to regulatory commissions and medical bodies during the 1980s. Thanks no doubt to his ‘ubiquitous’ profile, Ian
Kennedy was especially popular. Between 1984 and 1988 he was appointed to the GMC, a parliamentary Commission
on the Safety of Medicines, the government’s Expert Advisory Group on AIDS and a parliamentary review of
guidelines for research on foetuses and foetal tissues.  These appointments illustrate the political and medical utility
of bioethics. Recruiting individuals such as Kennedy to professional bodies helped doctors appear publicly
accountable, which safeguarded them from political criticism. Their presence on public inquiries and regulatory
committees, meanwhile, helped politicians challenge vested professional interests and fulfilled the neo-liberal
enthusiasm for oversight.
But this does not equate to the positivist accounts of ‘moral progress’ found in participant histories.  Despite
growing support for bioethics, the government only convened ‘broad-based’ inquiries to look into contentious new
procedures such as IVF and gene therapy during the 1980s. Non-doctors such as Kennedy remained firmly in the
minority on bodies such as the GMC and had little influence in their meetings.  As before, they also had little say in
the governance of clinical treatment. This offered a notable contrast to the United States, where hospital ethics
committees that included bioethicists and ‘community representatives’ had the power to consider treatment and advise
on individual cases.  Despite his very public lobbying, the permanent ‘inspectorate’ that Kennedy often endorsed
remained conspicuous by its absence.  This led him to complain that Britain lagged behind countries with national
ethics councils, and that ‘apart from the odd ad hoc committee, we seem happy to stumble along; so doctors, patients,
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But Kennedy appeared most frustrated by the fact that the courts still relied on the ‘hands-off’ philosophy embodied
in the Bolam ruling. This was apparent in the 1984 case Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Royal Bethlem
Hospital, which arose when a woman sued her doctor and his hospital for not disclosing the full risks of a pain-
relieving operation that left her partially paralysed.  Rejecting her claim for damages, the Court of Appeal and the
House of Lords both ruled that the doctor was not negligent since most responsible neurosurgeons elected not to warn
patients that the operation carried a small risk of paralysis.  This verdict distinguished Britain from the United States
and Canada, where courts increasingly argued that disclosure of information should be judged against what a
reasonable patient would want to know. And it also led Kennedy to bemoan the fact that instead of recognising a
patient’s right to control their own treatment, the British courts continued to endorse ‘the “right” of doctors to decide
for patients’.
Indeed, they endorsed the Bolam ruling well into the 1990s, ruling against patients who sued their doctors for failing
to disclose the failure rate of sterilisation procedures and the possible risks of contraceptive drugs, on the grounds that
the doctors in question had conformed with professional norms.  If we are to read bioethics as a decisive shift in the
location of biopower, then, it appears that figures such as Ian Kennedy only made inroads into regulatory committees
and public debates. In the clinic and the courtroom, as before, doctors remained the arbiters of best practice.
Conclusion
This chapter has detailed why bioethics ceased to be an ‘American trend’ during the 1980s. Calls for outside
involvement with science and medicine became increasingly influential in Britain during this period thanks to the
interaction between personal, political and professional agendas. Figures such as Ian Kennedy drew on the work of
American bioethicists, among others, to endorse an approach that the medical lawyer Jonathan Montgomery calls
‘ethical consumerism’, proposing the introduction of mechanisms that redressed paternalism and gave ‘outsiders’
greater say in the development of professional standards.
Kennedy claimed that this approach resulted from ‘a changed attitude among the products of the welfare state towards
the medical profession, whereby the doctor is expected to see his patients as partners in the enterprise of
healthcare’.  Like many ‘products of the welfare state’, Kennedy was influenced by the leftist politics of the 1960s
and 1970s. In addition to American bioethicists, his calls for outside involvement drew on Ivan Illich’s critique of
paternalism and reiterated the civil rights belief that ‘we should respect each person’s autonomy, his power to reach
his own decisions and act on them’.
This political background and his enthusiasm for the welfare state ensured that Kennedy was no fan of the
Conservative government. Indeed, he often criticised its belief that many aspects of public life could be ‘regulated (if
that is the right word) entirely by market forces’.  But while his demands for outside involvement and patient
autonomy were influenced by a markedly different ‘sense of social justice’ to that of Margaret Thatcher’s cabinet,
they nevertheless became influential thanks to the way they mapped on to the government’s neo-liberal desire for
publicly accountable and ‘customer-focused’ professions.  This overlap is crucial to understanding why Kennedy’s
calls for outside involvement were more influential than those of earlier figures such as Maurice Pappworth. While
doctors resisted these earlier proposals, they had little choice but to accept them once the Conservatives came to
power and it became clear that ‘the era which required paternalism is past’.
This latter point highlights that the demand for oversight did not emanate solely from Kennedy or politicians. While
there were disgruntled voices at the outset, doctors were certainly willing partners in the emergence of bioethics. This
stemmed partly from their sensitivity to the ‘political tide’ and a desire to align medicine with the growing demand for
oversight. But it also stemmed from the way in which Kennedy drew on American bioethicists and framed outside
involvement as beneficial to medicine. This undermines the ‘origin myth’ that portrays bioethics as a radical critique
of a conservative and reluctant medical profession. Indeed, Kennedy acknowledged this in 2007, telling the Guardian
that politicians and doctors would have both ignored him had he been nothing more than ‘a pain in the neck’.
This helps us identify what bioethics is and why it became influential. As Charles Rosenberg states, bioethics is best
viewed as a ‘mediating element’ between politicians, the public and health professionals.  But the form it takes
varies between different locations, thanks to the specific contexts in which it emerges and the individuals who
position themselves as bioethicists. In contrast to the United States, where theologians and then philosophers
dominated, Ian Kennedy’s work ensured that lawyers were integral to the emergence of British bioethics.  His Reith
Lectures, in particular, engendered a public debate on the law relating to medical practices and the position the courts

































Margaret Brazier and Sheila MacLean, and encouraged others to do likewise. The focus of much writing in this
burgeoning area of ‘medical law’ had more in common with work in American bioethics than traditional legal fields
such as tort, family and contract law, and focused on the moral aspects of medical practices and the ethical values that
underpinned patient rights.
Specific national factors also ensured that Kennedy’s vision of bioethics was more limited in Britain that in the United
States. Judges were reluctant to overturn the longstanding Bolam ruling and decide the appropriate standards for
medicine, while his calls for a national ethics committee were ignored. Those lawyers interested in medical law
instead exerted their greatest influence as members of ad hoc inquiries into new biomedical technologies, which
included greater numbers of ‘non-experts’ from the 1980s onwards. Yet despite the central role that lawyers played in
the emergence of British bioethics, and to the surprise of many, the government chose a philosopher to chair its high-
profile inquiry into IVF and embryo experiments in 1982.  The next chapter demonstrates how Mary Warnock’s
appointment fostered a debate on the place of philosophy in bioethics and, more contentiously, on how
interdisciplinary committees formulated acceptable rules for science and medicine.
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